Abstract-In game theory, the notion of expectation is made implicit. That is, most game-theoretic solution concepts, such as equilibrium, rationalizability, assume that agents expect one another to play their respective strategies according to the solution(s) induced by these solution concepts. This assumption limits the applicability of these solution concepts to many multiagent systems situated in open and dynamic environments due to obvious reasons: agents being resource-bounded, agents being rational-bounded, and agents not knowing some relevant aspects of the game they are playing. In this paper, by making agents' expectations explicit we provide a generic and flexible framework to allow concepts and results of game theory to be more readily mapped to the reasoning and decision making mechanisms in multi-agent systems.
I. INTRODUCTION
In this paper, we are concerned with the following question: Given an agent's beliefs about the interaction with other agents that she is about to engage, what is the most sensible course of actions she should take? The informal answer, from the point of view advocated in this paper, is that it depends on the expectations this agent has about the behaviours of other agents (and nature).
Expectations constitutes a major part in human's reasoning and decision making. There are typically two wellknown formulations of expectation. In the first instance, expectations have been used to render an agent's beliefs about the state of the world. For example, based on the expectations about the performance of a particular company, people buy or sell shares of the company. Gärdenfors and Makinson ( [1] , [2] ) explores the role of expectations in reasoning and argues that expectations lie at the core of common sense reasoning and, together with classical logic, form practical reasoning. 1 We, on the other hand, are mainly interested in the expectations an agent has about the decisions made by other agents (including nature). That is, based on the expectations about the strategies employed by other parties, an agent chooses her own strategies. Our work is naturally based on a large body of research on game theory.
Game theory provides a useful tool in the modeling and analysis of interaction between multiple agents. Moreover, most game-theoretic solution concepts such as equilibrium, rationalizability, provide detailed guidelines on how one should expect the rational players of a game to behave in that game. Nevertheless, standard models used in game theory implicitly assume that all players are perfect reasoners and have common knowledge of all significant aspects of the game they are playing. Such assumptions limit the applicability of the game-theoretic solution concepts to many multiagent systems situated in open and dynamic environments due to obvious reasons: agents being resource-bounded, agents being rational-bounded, and agents not knowing some relevant aspects of the game they are playing. In this paper, by making agents' expectations explicit we provide a generic and flexible framework to allow concepts and results of game theory to be more readily mapped to the reasoning and decision making mechanisms in multi-agent systems. In particular, we investigate a number of interaction settings in which agents' expectations could possibly be incorrect and look for mechanisms to allow agents to adjust their expectations to avoid bad outcomes, or to enforce expectations that lead to desirable outcomes.
In this paper, we confine our attention to interaction settings, or games, in normal form. While this is a major limitation in studying interactions in multi-agent systems, it's a necessary first step before we extend our study to encompass the more complex cases of multistage interactions. The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews the standard normal-form games. In Section 3, the notion of expectation in multi-agent systems is introduced with a number of examples to illustrate the role of expectation in multi-agent decision making. We then present our solution to the problems of multiple equilibria and information incompleteness in multi-agent interactions in Section 4. Finally, some remarks about the future work will conclude the paper. While there is not a separate section on the related work, relevant literature is introduced throughout the paper whenever we discuss a related topic.
II. PRELIMINARIES
For a game to be in normal form (see e.g., [3] ), we are provided with the following data: (i) the set of agents, also called players in game theory, N = {1, . . . , n}, (ii) the action space A i for each agent i, and (iii) for each agent i, the payoff function u i that gives agent i's von NeumannMorgenstern utility u i (a) for each profile a = a 1 , . . . , a n of actions.
Note that we will also interchangeably refer to actions as pure strategies, a terminology used extensively within game theory. Moreover, we will frequently refer to all agents other than some given agent i as "agent i's opponents" and denote them by "−i." We focus our attention on finite games, that is, games where
Following the literature on game theory, if A i denotes the set of pure strategies available to agent i, a mixed strategy σ i is a probability distribution over A i . Let Δ(.) denote the space of probability distributions over a set. Then the space of agent i's mixed strategies is denoted by Δ(A i ). Note that a pure strategy is also a mixed strategy, based on a degenerate probability distribution. Given an action a i ∈ A i , σ i (a i ) is the probability that σ i assigns to a i . The space of mixed strategy profiles is denoted by
which we denote by u i (σ) in a slight abuse of notation.
III. REASONING AND DECISION-MAKING WITH
EXPECTATION Each agent i ∈ N is equipped with an expectation function, denoted by Exp i that maps an agent j = i to a (possibly mixed) strategy of agent j's. That is, Exp i [j] ∈ Δ(A j ) represents the expectation of agent i about agent j's behaviour in this interaction. Furthermore, each agent i ∈ N makes its decision on what to do using a decision function, denoted by Dec i , that maps each strategy profile of agent i's opponents to a strategy from Δ(A i ). That is, Dec i : 
Notice the similarity between our notion of E-rationality and the solution concept of equilibrium in game theory. Nevertheless, the notion of E-rationality is too weak to be a solution concept on its own. This is because it is based on the agent's subjective expectation about the behaviours of other agents.
Example 1:
Consider the well-worn example of "the battle of the sexes," whose payoff matrix is given below:
In this example which is a normal-form game with two agents H(usband) and W(ife), both agents wish to go to an event together, but have different preferences between going to a football game (F) or to the ballet (B). Each agent gets a utility of 2 if both go to his/her preferred event, a utility of 1 if both go to the other's preferred event, and 0 if the two go to different events. The rows in the above payoff matrix represent agent H's action space with the top row indicating his preferred action. On the other hand, the columns in the above payoff matrix represent agent W's action space with the leftmost column indicating her preferred action. The first number in each cell indicates the payoffs to H while the second number indicates the payoffs to W.
It's known from game theory (see, for instance, [3] ) that the above game has three Nash equilibria: two in pure strategies, namely F, F and B, B , with payoffs (2, 1) and (1, 2), respectively, and one that is mixed. The mixed equilibrium is that agent H plays F with probability ) = 1, then an E-rational agent W would play F with probability 1. As a consequence, this pair of E-rational agents H and W will play the non-equilibrium strategy profile B, F with probability 1, obtaining the worst possible payoffs (0, 0)-due to their flawed expectations.
Throughout the rest of this paper, we will assume that multi-agent systems consist of only E-rational agents.
Definition 2:
• N is a finite set of E-rational agents; • For each agent i ∈ N , A i denotes a finite set of pure strategies available to agent i; and • For each agent i ∈ N , Exp i and Dec i are agent i's expectation function and decision function, respectively.
In order to relate our formalisation of agent's reasoning and decision making to existing literature in game theory and decision making, we define the notion of a multi-agent system playing games in normal form.
• N is also the set of players of the game G;
• The set of pure strategies available to player i ∈ N is A i ; and • The payoffs of all agents regarding all possible strategy profiles, given by the utility functions {u i } n i=1 , are common knowledge.
As discussed earlier, it's not realistic to assume that (resource-bounded) agents will always be able to correctly derive the equilibrium strategies for all agents involved, especially in the presence of uncertainty and incomplete information. Therefore, our aim is to help agents evaluate their own expectations so that these satisfy some weaker (but easier to verify) conditions. As such, our objective is not in the refinements of the solutions of a game, but rather in the refinements of the agents' expectations about other agents' behaviours.
When the game is sufficiently simple (so that all agents are able to derive the equilibrium strategy profile) and there is one unique equilibrium, then it's possible to expect that all agents act according to the equilibrium strategy profile. When the game is complex (e.g., computing equilibrium strategies requires very large computation resources, or there are multiple equilibria, or there is incomplete information or uncertainty), the solution concept of equilibrium could become too weak to allow agents to have the correct expectations about each other.
Informally, an agent i is justifiable if every other agent playing the game agent i believes that she is playing would make the decision she expects.
Example 2: Consider the following game in normal form (which is drawn from [3] ):
In this example which is a single-stage game with two agents A1, whose strategy space consists of U, M, and D, and A2, whose strategy space consists of L, M, and R, there is one single equilibrium strategy profile U, L , giving the agents payoffs (4, 3) .
Assume that a "naive" agent A1 believes that the strategy profile D, M gives the most optimal and fairest payoff outcomes of (9, 6) for the two agents, and subsequently expect that agent A2 would play M. That is,
However, according to Definition 4, agent A1's expectation (and thus, his decision) is unjustifiable. That is because, even if agent A2 expected that agent A1 would play D, being an E-rational agent, she would not play M but rather choose to play R. That is, Dec A2 [ D ](R) = 1.
As will be seen in the following theorem, justifiability together with E-rationality provides a sufficient condition to guarantee the well-known solution concept of Nash equilibrium for games in normal form.
Theorem 1: Let a multi-agent system M be given. If M plays a game G in normal form then a justifiable agent in M plays a Nash equilibrium strategy of G. Proof: Assume by way of contradiction that a justifiable agent i in M does not play a Nash equilibrium strategy of G. That is, agent i plays a non-equilibrium mixed strategy σ * i
i is a non-equilibrium strategy, for all possible strategy profiles by agent i's opponents
While the above theorem guarantees that a justifiable agent would play an equilibrium strategy, it doesn't guarantee that, in case of a game having multiple equilibria, a multi-agent system consisting of only justifiable agents would converge to playing one single equilibrium. This can be seen in Example 1 in which both agents H and W are justifiable and they follow strategies in different equilibria.
We now investigate the question of how an agent's expectations about other agents' decisions are based on her beliefs about other agents' preferences regarding different outcomes of the interaction.
Definition 5: Let a multi-agent system consisting of a set of agents N be given. Given an agent i ∈ N ,
• For a pair of strategy profiles α, β ∈ × i A i , if agent i believes that an agent j ∈ N prefers the outcome produced by the strategy profile α over the outcome produced by the strategy profile β then we will write β i→j α.
• A strategy profile α is said to i-dominate another strategy profile α, denoted by
REMARK:
• Essentially, α i α if the agent i believes that there is an agent k who has the incentive to unilaterally deviate from the strategy profile α by playing its strategy as specified by the strategy profile α . In other words, an agent i would not expect an i-dominated strategy profile to certainly be played, although she might expect that an i-dominated strategy profile to probably be played (see Example 3). Moreover, an agent i should not expect a strictly i-dominated strategy profile α, i.e. α ≺ i α for some α , to be played at all.
• In the above definition, we do not exclude the case of agents having beliefs about their own preferences,due perhaps to its bounded computational capacity.
Definition 6: Let a multi-agent system consisting of a set of agents N be given. Let i ∈ N be an agent and i * denote the transitive closure of the binary relation
Example 3: (Matching pennies)
In this example we modify the "matching pennies" example from game theory. Agents A1 and A2 simultaneously announce heads (H) or tails (T). If the announcements match then agent A1 gains a util, otherwise agent A1 loses a util. Assume that agent A1 doesn't know the payoffs of agent A2. Nevertheless, agent A1's beliefs about agent A2's payoffs regarding the possible outcomes of this interaction is expressed in the following payoff matrix (i.e, agent A1 believes that the two agents are playing the classical "matching pennies" game):
In this game we have:
And also, the A1-stable set of strategy profiles is { H, H , H, T , T, T , T, H }.
Lemma 1: Let a multi-agent system M be given and i an agent in M. The i-stable set of strategy profiles with respect to a transitive dominance relation i * is unique. Proof: Assume by way of contradiction that there are two i-stable sets S 1 and S 2 of strategy profiles with respect to a transitive dominance relation i * , such that
If M plays a game G in normal form then for any agent k ∈ N , let S k be the k-stable set of strategy profiles: 1) If the pure strategy profile α * ∈ × n i=1 A i is a Nash equilibrium of the game G then α * ∈ S k and there doesn't exist any α ∈ ×
2) If the mixed strategy profile σ
Before we prove this theorem, we state a useful lemma. From now on, we say that a set S of pure strategy profiles strictly k-dominates a strategy profile α (or α is strictly kdominated by S) if α is strictly k-dominated by a strategy profile in S.
Lemma 2:
We will prove this theorem based on Nash's theorem of the existence of mixed-strategy equilibrium as a fixed-point of the agents' "reaction correspondences." Agent i's reaction correspondence, r i , maps each strategy profile σ to the set of mixed strategies that maximise agent i's payoff when his opponents play σ −i . Although r i depends only on σ −i and not on σ i , it is written as a function of the strategies of all agents, because we will eventually look for a fixed point in the space Σ of mixed-strategy profiles. Define the (aggregate) correspondence r : Σ → 2 Σ to be the Cartesian product of the r i . A fixed point of r is such that σ ∈ r(σ), so that, for each agent i, σ i ∈ r i (σ). Thus, a fixed point of r is a Nash equilibrium. Nash proves that all finite normal-form games satisfy the sufficient conditions for r to have a fixed point (according to Kakutani's fixed-point theorem).
Since σ * is a Nash equilibrium of the game G, σ * ∈ r(σ * ). Based on the definition of reaction correspondence functions, for every agent i, there does not exist a pure strategy θ i ∈ A i and
Now, assume that α ∈ S k . We will show that there is a mixed-strategy equilibrium σ * of the game G such that
Assume (by way of contradiction) that none of the Nash equilibria of the game G satisfies that condition. Then, by applying the reaction correspondence function r to α (remember that a pure-strategy profile is a profile in degenerate mexied strategies), then since α is not a Nash equilibrium,
(Note that we treat α as a mixed strategy that assign the probability 1 to all pure strategies α i in α.) Moreover, as σ ∈ r(α) and α is not a Nash equilibrium, u j (α) ≤ u j (σ). Therefore,
∈ S k then we also have a contradiction (with condition (i.) in Definition 6) due to condition (ii.) in Definition 6 and transitivity of ≺ k * .
Theorem 2 shows that, under the strict assumptions made by (traditional) game theorists, our notion of stability is reduced to the more traditional solution concept of Nash equilibrium. However, in situations where these assumptions do not hold the decision problem becomes more complex. Firstly, to an agent i, if the i-stable set of strategy profiles contain multiple strategy profiles then either there are multiple equilibria or there can exist a mixed strategy, or both. The second part of Theorem 2 tells us that the pure strategy to be played (with positive probability) by an agent i in a mixed equilibrium must be present a strategy profile included in the i-stable set of strategy profiles. This allows more efficient computation for the mixed equilibria. Nevertheless, unless agent i knows precisely the payoffs of other agents, the correct probabilities of different pure strategies in a mixed equilibrium can not be computed.
More importantly, in the presence of incomplete information, the agents now face the questions of whether their own beliefs about other agents' preferences are correct, and even when that is the case then whether other agents' beliefs are correct, and whether they know that their opponents' beliefs are correct, and so on.
IV. MULTIPLE EQUILIBRIA AND INCOMPLETE INFORMATION
In the preceding section, we defined the justifiability of agents' expectation (and decision). Furthermore, we introduce the notion of stability of a set of pure strategy profiles with respect to an agent's beliefs. We also argue that an agent's expectations about other agents' behaviours are rendered in her stable set of strategy profiles. However, unless all agents share the same beliefs, an agent does not know whether or not her expectation and decision are justifiable.
A. Relevant literature
Note that even when an agent's beliefs about other agents' preferences are correct, her expectations about other agents' behaviours can still be incorrect. 3 And subsequently, the agent could still make decisions that are suboptimal for herself and probably also for other agents (unless other agents are aware of her incorrect expectations and able to capitalise on her decisions). It's easy to see that the problem of multiple equilibria becomes a special case of this problem of agents' possibly incorrect expectations about one another's behaviour. In response to these issues, game theorists probably point to the following game-theoretic solution concepts: correlated equilibrium, rationalizability, and self-confirming equilibrium.
We will start our analysis with these concepts. In games with multiple equilibria, the assumption that an equilibrium is played relies on there being some mechanism or process that leads all the agents to expect the same equilibrium. In other words, the agents need a mechanism to correlate their information so that bad outcomes can be avoided. Basically, by using a publicly observable random variable (called a "signaling device" whose use is common knowledge), the agents will act according to the outcome of this variable. Aumann's [6] notion of a correlated equilibrium captures what could be achieved with any such signals. This mechanism allows the agents to obtain any payoff vector in the convex hull 4 of the set of Nash-equilibrium payoffs. The concept of rationalizability [7] , [8] is particularly relevant to our work as it essentially tries to capture the fact that a rational agent will use only those strategies that are best response to some beliefs she might have about the strategies of her opponents. Moreover, the construction of this solution concept is based on the infinite regress of the agents' beliefs about other agents' strategies based on their beliefs about each other's strategies, ad infinitum. The construction goes through an iterative process so that the more rounds the process proceeds, the less strategies will survive the rationalizability test. This fits well to the limited computation capability of the agents modeled in our framework.
And finally, the concept of self-confirming equilibrium, as presented by Fudenberg and Levine [9] , requires an agent's action to be a best response to some conjecture which is consistent with the partial information she gets (about other agents' actions) but does not impose any rationality conditions on the conjecture assignment about the other agents' actions. These conjectures roughly correspond to our 3 The case when agents have correct beliefs about one another's preferences but can still have incorrect expectations about their opponents' behaviours is best known in studies on oligopolies (see e.g., [4] ). Bresnahan [5] gives a detailed account on how different behavioural assumptions can provide entirely different predictions about equilibrium outcomes of the duopoly game. 4 The convex hull of a set X is the smallest convex set that contains X. notion of expectations, although self-confirming equilibrium requires that conjectures be correct along the equilibrium path of play (in an extensive-form game). This requirement is nevertheless still a very strong condition for multi-agent systems consisting of bounded rational agents. Based on these game-theoretic solution concepts, we propose to tackle the problem of reasoning and decision making for bounded rational agents with possibly incorrect beliefs as follows. First, for nonzero-sum interactions we introduce a non-biased middle agent who will facilitate the correlation of information between the interacting agents. The use of such middle agents is quite common within human society with establishments such as governments, institutions, etc. It's also fairly common to have roles such as coordinator or manager in cooperative interactions, and mediator or arbitrator in non-cooperative interactions. On the other hand, to render the intuitions behind rationalizability and self-confirming equilibrium, an agent's expectations are essentially her rationalizable beliefs and her conjectures about other agents' strategies.
B. Middle agent and enforceable commitments
The use of middle agents to facilitate more efficient interactions in multi-agent systems has been studied in a number of contexts (see e.g., [10] , [11] ). While our proposed use of a middle agent is based on the signaling mechanisms used in correlated equilibrium and self-confirming equilibrium, the middle agent is not a passive device as in these solution concepts. Rather it plays an active role and is equipped with its own reasoning capability.
A naive solution to the problem of expectation correlation-based on the assumption that middle agents are neutral and non-profitable-is that all agents will submit their payoffs regarding all possible outcomes of the interaction to the middle agent and the middle agent tells the agents what they should do. This solution does not work because in general middle agents do not have the authority to impose an outcome.
In the trivial cases when there are no discrepancies between the agents' stable sets of strategy profiles and they are not singleton sets, the middle agent acts as a simple signaling device to correlate the agents' decisions (see e.g., [3] ). On the other hand, when the agents' stable sets of strategy profiles are not the same, the middle agent may need to help the agents coordinate their activities. We will assume that all agents i who want to be part of this coordination process make the relations i→j h , for j ∈ N and h ∈ H being the current history, available to the middle agent. Notice, however, that the agents have the incentive to misrepresent their beliefs about the payoffs regarding certain outcomes of the game.
Example 4: Reconsider the game presented in Example 2. Assume that the given payoff matrix is slightly modified as follows.
That is, M, L is the only strategy profile whose payoffs have been changed. In this example, when the strategy profile M, L is played then it's common knowledge that agent A1 obtain a payoff of 5 while agent A2's payoff, denoted by x, is his private information. Note that agent A2's strategy of playing M and agent A1's strategy of playing D are iteratively eliminated via iterated strict dominance. Now, when x > 6 then agent A2's pure strategy R is also (iteratively) strictly dominated by L. And, subsequently we have the strategy profile M, L as the unique Nash equilibrium of this game. However, when x < 6 then the pure strategy R is not strictly dominated by L. And the game has a mixed equilibrium in which agent A2 plays L with probability p A2 L = 3 4 and plays R with probability Firstly, due to agent A1's incomplete information about agent A2's preferences, agent A1 maintains two A1-stable sets of strategy profiles:
(i) in one, where M, R A1→A2 M, L , i.e., x > 6, the A1-stable set of strategy profile contains only one strategy profile M, L ; (ii) in another, where x < 6, the A1-stable set of strategy profile contains all four strategy profiles M, L , M, R , U, L , and U, R . Secondly, even when x < 6, agent A2 has the incentive to misrepresent his payoff regarding the strategy profile M, L to make other agents believe that x > 6. By doing so, he is able to take advantage of agent A1's decision of playing M and to deviate from the supposedly equilibrium strategy profile M, L by playing the strategy R to obtain the maximum payoff of 6.
Lemma 3: Let a multi-agent system M be given. If an agent i has incomplete information about the preferences of other agents then there may be multiple i-stable sets of strategy profiles with respect to different completions of the (partial) dominance relation agent i has about the outcomes of the interaction.
In addition to the problem of multiple equilibria, the agents now face the more complex and general problem of multiple expectations, i.e., each agent may have more than one stable set of strategy profiles. There needs to be some mechanism or process that leads all the agents to expect the same outcome. We will refer to this as the problem of expectation alignment.
Definition 7: Let a multi-agent system M be given. For each agent i in M, let S i denote the set of i-stable sets of strategy profiles. REMARK: It's important to note that the above definition is only concerned with the agents' beliefs in equilibrium.
As Example 4 shows, game-theoretic solution concepts do not provide any way for agents to credibly communicate their private information to other parties in order to facilitate more efficient outcomes. Essentially, words must be backed up by actions. In general, when an agent states that he prefers a particular outcome, he must eventually show his commitment to play the strategy in his claim. Moreover, there must be a mechanism to enforce agents to discharge their respective commitments.
The simplest mechanism to enable enforcement of agents' commitments is, by assuming availability of side-payment, to require agents to set aside in advance a sufficiently large penalty in case they fail to discharge their commitments. While there are obviously several limitations with this simplistic approach, we will employ this mechanism in this paper for the purpose of commitment enforcement. Before we proceed, we need to explain what it means for the penalty to be sufficiently large. Taking a simplistic view, a payment equivalent to the utility of the most attractive outcome that an agent who makes a commitment can deviate to is considered to be sufficiently large. For instance, in Example 4, the middle agent can require agent A2 to deposit a payment equivalent to a utility of 6 (to A2) so that when agent A2 doesn't commit to playing L then this payment will be transferred to agent A1; otherwise, this payment is returned to agent A2.
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Definition 8: Let a multi-agent system M = (N, {(A i , Exp i , Dec i )} i∈N ) with side-payment be given. An enforceable commitment made by an agent i ∈ N consists of (i) a set S ⊆ A i of pure strategies that are feasible to agent i, and (ii) a monetary penalty payment p.
When α is a strategy profile and p is a monetary penalty payment, we denote by (α, p i ) the outcome in which the strategy profile α is carried out and the penalty p is applied on agent i.
Definition 9: Let a multi-agent system M = (N, {(A i , Exp i , Dec i )} i∈N ) with side-payment be given. Assume that C = (S C , p C ) is an enforceable commitment made by an agent i ∈ N and consider a set of pure strategy profiles P ⊆ A(h). A strategy profile α ∈ P is said to be C-unfeasible in P to an agent j ∈ N if (i) α i / ∈ S C , and (ii) ∀ρ ∈ 5 Note that, in this example, it's possible to work out an even tighter penalty for agent A2's commitment. First, it's trivial to observe that, by assuming that x ≥ 0, agent A2's payoff in the mixed equilibrium is at least as large as 45 14 . Thus, it's sufficient to impose a payment of 39 14 to avoid agent A2 from committing to playing L and then deviating to play R. However, this is irrelevant to the present discussion.
P.(α, p
C i ) j→i ρ. Informally, if P represents the set of all strategy profiles considered possible by agent j then by making the commitment C, agent i effectively helps agent j rule out all C-unfeasible strategy profiles in P . Agent i achieves this by making the promise not to play any strategy that is not in S C and this promise is bound by the penalty payment p C making deviating from any strategy profile ρ in P to a Cunfeasible strategy profile unattractive to i.
REMARK:
The above enforcement condition (i.e., condition (ii) in Definition 9) is a very strong condition. It's of course possible to work out a weaker condition that could still guarantee that an enforceable commitment would eventually be discharged. See, for instance, footnote 3 . Definition 10: Let i and j be two agents in a multiagent system. Assume that C = (S C , p C ) is an enforceable commitment made by an agent i ∈ N and let S j denote the set of j-stable sets of strategy profiles. The commitment C is said to be informationally beneficial to agent j if the set of C-unfeasible strategy profiles in
Definition 11: Consider a group of agents Γ in a given multi-agent system. An enforceable commitment C made by an agent i ∈ Γ is said to be socially credible to the group Γ if:
1) The members of Γ have consistent beliefs in equilibrium, and 2) There is at least an agent j ∈ Γ such that the commitment C is informationally beneficial to j. It's important to note that when a sequence of socially credible commitments converges the expectations of the agents in a multi-agent system to a single strategy profile, the resulting strategy profile is not necessarily a Nash equilibrium. This is because enforceable commitments effectively change the payoffs of certain outcomes of the original game.
Theorem 3: When making enforceable commitments, agents in a multi-agent system could effectively rule out Nash equilibria of the original game. Proof: Let h i be the function that maps penalty payments p i to the agent i's utility. That is, given a commitment C = (S C , p C ) made by agent i ∈ N , where S C ⊆ A i , the utility of agent i is defined to be:
If α * is a Nash equilibium, by making the
for some γ i ∈ S C , the agent i rules out the equilibrium α * of the original game.
For instance, let's reconsider Example 4. Assume now that agent A2's private information x = 5. As discussed earlier, this game has a mixed equilibrium in which agent A1 plays U with probability 1 2 and plays M with probability 1 2 , and agent A2 plays L with probability 3 4 and plays R with probability 1 4 . This mixed equilibrium gives agent A2 an expected payoff of 4. Thus, agent A2 would want the strategy profile M, L to be played with probability 1 so that she would obtain an expected payoff of 5. Therefore, agent A2 would be willing to make an enforceable commitment ({L}, p), where p is monetarily equivalent to 6 utils. Subsequently, the two agents A1 and A2 converge to playing the strategy profile M, L with probability 1.
V. CONCLUSION
We have introduced a notion of expectation for multiagent reasoning and decision making in complex problem settings. Our approach relaxes standard assumptions made in game theory about agents being perfect reasoners with full rationality. Given that an agent' beliefs can possibly be incorrect, we introduce a notion of stability of a set of strategy profiles, relative to an agent's beliefs. This notion can be viewed as the "local equilibrium" maintained in the agent's beliefs.
To cope with the problem of agents expecting different equilibria, we proposed a mechanism that is based on the notions of correlated equilibrium and rationalizability to help agents correlate their expectations. To allow for private information to be credibly exchanged between agents we introduced the notion of enforceable commitments. By making enforceable commitments, an agent gives a warranty to other agents about its commitment to discharge the promises it made.
While explicit modeling of expectations in multi-agent interactions is still in its infancy, it has started to attract some reasonable amount of attention. In particular, Aumann and Dreze [12] introduces the notion of rational expectations in games. Their work shares the same motivations as our work. That is, given different contexts of a game (e.g., the players' attitudes, their expectations about each other, culture and history, etc.) which are called "game situations" by Aumann and Dreze, players may form different expectations about other players' strategies. Aumann and Dreze then go on to describe how a player i can form her expectations in terms of the correlated equilibria of the doubled game 2G in which each of i's strategies in the game G appears twice. The player i's expectations are rational if common knowledge of rationality and a common prior obtain. In other words, they characterise a class of rational expectations under some conditions.
We are extending our framework to deal with multistage interactions. Because of incomplete information, agents can refine their expectations by making observations about the opponents' actions and accordingly revising their expectations in future stages of the current encounter or in future interactions. In particular, we are investigating the situation when players may be unaware of the complete structure of the game (see e.g., [13] , [14] ). For instance, they may not be aware of moves (or, actions) that they and other players can make. Subsequently, it's important to take into account observation-based phenomena including: surprises, regrets and disappointments (see e.g., [15] , [16] on expectation and observation).
